Sean Carroll has managed to touch on three of my favorite subjects in one, albeit cumbersome, blog post. Here’s an excerpt:
We talk about the world using different levels of description, appropriate to the question of interest. Some levels might be thought of as “fundamental” and others as “emergent,” but they are all there. Does baseball exist? It’s nowhere to be found in the Standard Model of particle physics. But any definition of “exist” that can’t find room for baseball seems overly narrow to me. It’s true that we could take any particular example of a baseball game and choose to describe it by listing the exact quantum state of each elementary particle contained in the players and the bat and ball and the field etc. But why in the world would anyone think that is a good idea? The concept of baseball is emergent rather than fundamental, but it’s no less real for all of that.
Likewise for free will. We can be perfectly orthodox materialists and yet believe in free will, if what we mean by that is that there is a level of description that is useful in certain contexts and that includes “autonomous agents with free will” as crucial ingredients. That’s the “variety of free will worth having,” as Daniel Dennett would put it.
I’m not saying anything original — this is a well-known position, probably the majority view among contemporary philosophers. It’s a school of thought called compatibilism: see Wikipedia, or (better) the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Free will as an emergent phenomenon can be perfectly compatible with an underlying materialist view of the world.
View the post in its entirety:
Fralinger Weekend in Wildwood instagram.com/p/sBLp1eJwwX/
Sneaky bun is sneaky instagram.com/p/sAJebGpw1i/
Attribution fallacy: If you trip walking down the sidewalk, you are clumsy. If I trip, it’s because there was a crack in the sidewalk.
The Legend of Zelda theme by request! @ The Porch at 30th instagram.com/p/r41PHqpw3Q/